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Turning the Tide: The Future of HIV 
Criminalization after Rhoades v. State and 




In the decades since it first appeared in the United States, HIV has gone from a 
mysterious and terrifying death sentence to a preventable, manageable chronic condition.1 
Law and public policy, however, have evolved much more slowly than scientific 
knowledge, or treatment and prevention options. The majority of states use criminal law 
as a misguided and ineffective tool to combat the spread of HIV.2 Statutes that 
criminalize people living with HIV were passed when significantly less was known, from 
both a scientific and a policy perspective, about how to prevent or treat the virus.3 As a 
result, most of those statutes criminalize behavior that poses an extremely low risk, or 
even no risk, of HIV transmission4 and further contribute to misinformation, stigma, and 
skewed perceptions of sexual responsibility—ultimately fueling the spread of the virus 
rather than curbing it.5 
Until 2014, Iowa’s HIV criminalization law was one of the most draconian in the 
country, carrying a maximum sentence of twenty-five years imprisonment and lifetime 
registration as a sex offender.6 Moreover, it captured within its ambit activities that carry 
no more than a theoretical risk of HIV transmission.7  
But in the summer of 2014, the Iowa Supreme Court made history by ruling in 
Rhoades v. State that Iowa’s HIV criminalization statute could not be used to prosecute 
                                                 
1 See Françoise Barré-Sinoussi et al., Past, Present and Future: 30 Years of HIV research, 11 NATURE 
REVIEWS MICROBIOLOGY 877, 877–80 (2013). 
2 Thirty-two states have HIV-specific criminal statutes. See State-by-State Chart of HIV-Specific Statutes 
and Prosecutorial Tools, CTR. FOR HIV L. & POL’Y 1–4, http://hivlawandpolicy.org/sites/www. 
hivlawandpolicy.org/files/State%20By%20State%20HIV%20Laws%20Chart%20updated%2010-21-13.pdf 
(last updated Oct. 21, 2013).  
3 Code citations for all state HIV-specific criminal statutes can be found in 1 POSITIVE JUSTICE PROJECT, 
THE CTR. FOR HIV LAW & POLICY, ENDING & DEFENDING AGAINST HIV CRIMINALIZATION: STATE AND 
FEDERAL LAWS AND PROSECUTIONS (2d ed. 2015), 
http://www.hivlawandpolicy.org/sites/www.hivlawandpolicy.org/files/HIV%20Crim%20Manual%20%28u
pdated%205.4.15%29.pdf [hereinafter ENDING & DEFENDING]. The majority of these statutes were passed 
in the 1980s or 1990s, while most of the key treatment and prevention advances discussed in this Note 
occurred in the 2000s and 2010s. See Barré-Sinoussi, supra note 1 (discussing recent advances). 
4 See discussion infra Section II.B.2. 
5 See, e.g., 15 Ways HIV Criminalization Laws Harm Us All, LAMBDA LEGAL, 
http://www.lambdalegal.org/sites/default/files/publications/downloads/15-ways-hiv-criminalization-laws-
harm-us-all.pdf (last visited Feb. 5, 2016) (submitting that HIV criminalization laws “[c]reate a 
disincentive to HIV testing” because “if you don’t know your status, you can’t be prosecuted”). 
6 See Section III.B.1 infra. 
7 See discussion infra Section III.B.1.  
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people living with HIV for consensual sex acts that pose no reasonable risk of 
transmitting HIV.8 The court’s decision was the end of a long journey for Nick Rhoades, 
who had been sentenced to twenty-five years in prison for performing oral sex without a 
condom and anal sex with a condom,9  both of which pose little to no risk of transmitting 
HIV.10 In addition, Rhoades had an undetectable viral load11, which means that the level 
of the virus in his bloodstream was extremely low12, further reducing or eliminating his 
possibility of transmitting HIV.11 By reversing Rhoades’s conviction,14 the Iowa Supreme 
Court became the first high court in the country to incorporate modern scientific 
knowledge of HIV transmission into an HIV criminalization statute.15 
At the same time that Rhoades was before the Iowa Supreme Court, the state 
legislature also repealed the law under which Rhoades had been convicted and replaced it 
with a much narrower, more nuanced alternative.12 The new law provides for graded 
offenses, which depend in part on the defendant's specific intent.17 This means that the 
most severe conviction under the statute is only available if the defendant specifically 
intended to transmit HIV, rather than merely intending to have sex. The severity of the 
offense is also dependent on whether transmission actually occurs, rather than merely a 
risk of transmission. Where the defendant does not intend to, and does not, transmit HIV, 
the defendant is only subject to a misdemeanor conviction.13 Finally, the new statute 
imposes a higher “substantial risk” standard for transmission risk,14 and creates an 
affirmative defense when the defendant takes practical measures to prevent 
transmission.15 The combination of judicial and legislative changes in 2014 thus brought 
Iowa from being one of the most severe to one of the most enlightened jurisdictions in the 
United States on issues of HIV in criminal law. 
This Note begins with an overview of the current scientific knowledge of HIV 
transmission and the historical background of HIV in American criminal law. Next, I 
discuss Iowa’s old HIV criminalization law, the Iowa Supreme Court’s opinion in 
Rhoades, and Iowa’s concurrent legislative change. Finally, I discuss the future 
implications of Rhoades in Iowa and elsewhere. Though concurrent legislative reform in 
Iowa makes the court’s decision less important as binding precedent, I argue that the 
                                                 
8 See Rhoades v. State, 848 N.W.2d 22, 27–28 (Iowa 2014). 
9 Id. at 25–26. The district court suspended Rhoades’s twenty-five-year sentence on his motion to 
reconsider and placed him on five years’ probation. Id. at 26.  
10 See Section II.A infra. 
11 Rhoades, 848 N.W.2d at 33.  
12 See Section II.A infra. 
11 See Section II.A infra. 
14 Rhoades, 848 N.W.2d at 33. 
15 See id.  
12 See discussion infra Part III. 
17 See IOWA CODE § 706D.3(1) (2015).  
13 See id. § 709D.3(1)–(4).  
14 See id. § 709D.2(2).  
15 See id. § 709D.3(7). See generally id. § 709D.2(3) (defining the phrase “practical means to prevent 
transmission” as used in the statute to mean “substantial good-faith compliance with a treatment regimen 
prescribed by the person’s health care provider, if applicable, and with behavioral recommendations of the 
person’s health care provider or public health officials, which may include but are not limited to the use of 
a medically indicated respiratory mask or a prophylactic device, to measurably limit the risk of 
transmission of the contagious or infectious disease”). 
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decision remains relevant in Iowa, and more importantly provides valuable persuasive 
precedent to guide reform efforts nationwide. The force of the decision as persuasive 
precedent varies significantly from state to state depending on each state’s current 
approach to HIV criminalization. In all states, however, I argue that advocates can and 
should aggressively use the Iowa precedent to support attacks on HIV criminalization, 
whether at the trial, sentencing, appellate, parole, or post-conviction relief stages. 
Moreover, I argue that advocates should also draw upon the Iowa experience to advocate 
for legislative reform or, in the absence of legislative reform, to urge prosecutors to 
exercise their discretion not to pursue most HIV criminalization cases. 
II.  BACKGROUND 
A.  HIV Treatment and Prevention 
 HIV is the virus that can lead to AIDS if left untreated.16 With current treatment 
options, however, an HIV diagnosis has relatively little impact on life expectancy.17 
Nonetheless, a large proportion of people living with HIV do not know their HIV status, 
and a significant proportion of those who know their status do not have access to 
adequate treatment.18 This situation renders improved medical possibilities illusory under 
the social and economic realities of many people living with HIV.19 Moreover, the 
considerable misinformation, fear, and stigma that continue to surround HIV20 can have a 
greater impact on quality of life than the virus itself and can discourage testing and 
prevention efforts.21 
The risk of HIV transmission begins when a bodily fluid carrying the virus (e.g., 
semen, pre-seminal fluid, blood, rectal fluid, vaginal fluid, or breast milk) is transmitted 
from a person living with HIV into the bloodstream of an HIV-negative individual.22 The 
most common methods of transmission in the United States are sexual activity and shared 
                                                 
16 See generally What is HIV?, CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION, 
http://www.cdc.gov/hiv/basics/whatishiv.html.  
17 Barré-Sinoussi et al., supra note 1, at 879. 
18 CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION, TODAY’S HIV/AIDS EPIDEMIC 2 (2015), 
http://www.cdc.gov/nchhstp/newsroom/docs/hivfactsheets/todaysepidemic-508.pdf. 
19 The CDC estimates that 18% of people living with HIV do not know their status, and that only 33% of 
people living with HIV are receiving treatment. CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION, TODAY’S 
HIV/AIDS EPIDEMIC 2 (2015), http://www.cdc.gov/nchhstp/newsroom/docs/hivfactsheets/todaysepidemic-
508.pdf.  
20 In a 2011 survey, many respondents believed that HIV could be transmitted by wholly impossible casual 
social contact such as sharing a glass of water, and a majority of respondents were uncomfortable with 
having a person living with HIV as a coworker, teacher, roommate, or cook. See THE HENRY J. KAISER 
FAMILY FOUND., HIV/AIDS AT 30: A PUBLIC OPINION PERSPECTIVE 6–7 (2011), 
http://kaiserfamilyfoundation.files.wordpress.com/2013/07/8186-hiv-survey-report_final.pdf [hereinafter 
HIV/AIDS AT 30]. 
21 See CIVIL RIGHTS DIV., U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, BEST PRACTICES GUIDE TO REFORM HIV-SPECIFIC 
CRIMINAL LAWS TO ALIGN WITH SCIENTIFICALLY-SUPPORTED FACTORS 2 (2014), http://aids.gov/federal-
resources/national-hiv-aids-strategy/doj-hiv-criminal-law-best-practices-guide.pdf [hereinafter BEST 
PRACTICES GUIDE] (“HIV stigma has been shown to be a barrier to HIV testing . . . stigma hampers 
prevention” (footnote omitted)). 
22 See HIV Transmission, CENTERS FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION, 
http://www.cdc.gov/hiv/basics/transmission.html (last updated Dec. 14, 2015). 
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drug needles.23 This Note focuses on transmission through sexual activity, which is also 
the primary focus of many criminal laws and prosecutions targeting people living with 
HIV. Some criminal laws also target spitting, biting, and similar acts of non-sexual 
aggression, which carry no risk or virtually no risk of transmission.24 The criticisms 
outlined for sex-related laws and prosecutions apply similarly in non-sex-related cases. 
If no mitigating factors are present, the highest risk sex act is receptive anal 
intercourse, meaning that the insertive partner is HIV positive and the receptive partner is 
HIV negative.25 The risk of transmission in that scenario is approximately 138 in 10,000, 
or 1.38%.26 The next highest-risk sex acts are insertive anal intercourse (0.11%), 
receptive vaginal intercourse (0.08%), and insertive vaginal intercourse (0.04%).27 It 
remains a subject of debate whether receptive oral intercourse carries any risk at all, but if 
so, it is an extremely low risk; insertive oral intercourse carries no risk.28 
 Several factors can mitigate these risks. It has been well known since very early in 
the HIV epidemic that latex condoms dramatically reduce the risk of transmission.29 
Newer advances, known as biomedical prevention, have further revolutionized the 
landscape of HIV-prevention methods.30 The most relevant form of biomedical 
prevention for purposes of this Note is treatment as prevention (TasP). TasP originated 
with the discovery that HIV treatment reduces the quantity of the virus in an individual’s 
bloodstream (i.e., the individual’s “viral load”), and that the lower an individual’s viral 
load, the less likely it is for him or her to transmit HIV.31 Thus, treatment not only 
improves the quality of life of the person living with HIV but also substantially inhibits 
his or her risk of transmitting HIV to others. The target viral load for an individual 
undergoing treatment is “undetectable,” or so low that current technology cannot detect 
the virus’s presence.32 This goal is achievable for most people living with HIV if they 
have adequate access to treatment and are able to adhere to their treatment.33 It is now 
                                                 
23 Id. 
24 See generally Mona Loutfy et al., Canadian Consensus Statement on HIV and its Transmission in the 
Context of Criminal Law, 25 CAN. J. INFECTIOUS DISEASES & MED. MICROBIOLOGY 135 (2014);  State-by-
State Chart of HIV-Specific Statutes and Prosecutorial Tools, CTR. FOR HIV L. & POL’Y 1–4, 
http://hivlawandpolicy.org/sites/www. 
hivlawandpolicy.org/files/State%20By%20State%20HIV%20Laws%20Chart%20updated%2010-21-13.pdf 
(last updated Oct. 21, 2013).  
25 See id. 
26 HIV Transmission Risk, CENTERS FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION, 
http://www.cdc.gov/hiv/policies/law/risk.html (last updated Nov. 16, 2015). 
27 See id. 
28 Mona Loutfy et al., Canadian Consensus Statement on HIV and its Transmission in the Context of 
Criminal Law, 25 CAN. J. INFECTIOUS DISEASES & MED. MICROBIOLOGY 135, 137 (2014). 
29 See id. at 136. 
30 See Barré-Sinoussi et al., supra note 1, at 880. 
31 See id. 
32 See HIV Transmission Risk, supra note 31. 
33 See Loutfy et al., supra note 29, at 136–37. 
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well established that an undetectable viral load yields a dramatic reduction in 
transmission risk,34 with one study suggesting that it completely eliminates all risk.35 
Other forms of biomedical prevention are post-exposure prophylaxis (PEP) and pre-
exposure prophylaxis (PrEP). While TasP is a form of prevention practiced by the HIV-
positive partner, PEP and PrEP are forms of prevention practiced by HIV-negative 
individuals at risk of exposure. PEP is a short-term treatment taken after a potential 
exposure.36 PEP can have unpleasant but non-life-threatening side effects, but it 
substantially reduces the chances of becoming infected.37 
PrEP is a long-term, daily treatment with minimal side effects that also 
substantially reduces the chances of becoming infected and is recommended to 
populations at high risk.38 In April 2014, Washington State launched a drug assistance 
program to increase the availability of PrEP in high-risk communities,39 and other states 
have considered similar programs.40 
All of these medical advances mean that it is now easier than ever for a person 
living with HIV to avoid transmitting the virus, for a person without HIV to avoid 
contracting it, and for a person newly diagnosed to live a long and healthy life. 
Cumulatively, these changes suggest that investments in education, treatment, and 
prevention have the potential to finally bring the HIV epidemic under control and cast 
considerable doubt on the wisdom of targeting people living with HIV for harsh criminal 
sanctions. 
B.  HIV Criminalization 
The majority of states criminalize consensual sex acts for people living with HIV 
if they do not disclose their HIV status to their HIV-negative partner before having sex—
                                                 
34 See, e.g., id. at 137; see also Prevention Benefits of HIV Treatment, CENTERS FOR DISEASE CONTROL & 
PREVENTION, http://www.cdc.gov/hiv/prevention/research/tap/ (last updated Apr. 15, 2013) (discussing a 
study showing a 96% reduction in transmission risk).  
35 See Alison Rodger, PARTNER Study Grp., Presentation at Conference on Retroviruses and 
Opportunistic Infections: HIV Transmission Risk Through Condomless Sex if the HIV Positive Partner Is 
on Suppressive ART (Mar. 4, 2014), 
http://www.cphiv.dk/portals/0/files/CROI_2014_PARTNER_slides.pdf. The PARTNER study found zero 
HIV transmissions in over 30,000 condomless sex acts between HIV-positive individuals with undetectable 
viral loads and their HIV-negative partners. See id.  
36 See PEP, CENTERS FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION, http://www.cdc.gov/hiv/basics/pep.html (last 
updated Jan. 21, 2016). 
37 Id. 
38 See PrEP, CENTERS FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION, http://www.cdc.gov/hiv/basics/prep.html 
(last updated Dec. 14, 2015). 
39 See generally Pre-Exposure Prophylaxis Drug Assistance Program (PrEP DAP), WASH. ST. DEP’T 
HEALTH, 
http://www.doh.wa.gov/YouandYourFamily/IllnessandDisease/HIVAIDS/HIVCareClientServices/PrEPDA
P (last visited Oct. 29, 2014). See also Dave Kern, Six Lessons for Health Departments Using Prep as an 
HIV Prevention Tool, Dec. 10, 2014, https://www.nastad.org/blog/six-lessons-health-departments-using-
prep-hiv-prevention-tool.  
40 The Illinois Department of Public Health announced a similar program, which was then halted shortly 
after Governor Bruce Rauner took office. See Revolutionary PrEP Program in Illinois Halted by Governor 
Before Launch, AIDS FOUND. CHI. (Apr. 10, 2015), http://www.aidschicago.org/page/news/all-
news/revolutionary-prep-program-in-illinois-halted-by-governor-before-launch. 
Vol. 11:1] Brian Cox 
33 
or, more accurately, if they cannot prove that they disclosed their status.41 In this section, 
I broadly outline the varying forms that these laws take in jurisdictions across the country 
and the criticisms that have been raised against HIV criminalization generally. I then 
discuss in detail the Iowa HIV criminalization statute under which Nick Rhoades was 
convicted. 
1. HIV Criminalization in General 
 
 Though most states criminalize HIV exposure in some manner, there is 
considerable variation among these laws. While it is difficult to categorize these statutes 
neatly, some of the key variations include the following: 
(a) Covered acts: Some statutes use general language about sex acts that pose 
a risk of transmitting HIV, at least theoretically allowing the fact-finder or 
the appellate courts to consider evidence of risk.42 Many states’ statutes, 
however, enumerate specific sex acts, often including no-risk or 
negligible-risk activities such as oral sex, which leaves less room for 
advocates to present evidence on the actual risk level of a given act.43 
(b) Significance of prophylactic measures: Under the plain language of the 
statutes, wearing a condom is a defense in only a small handful of states.44 
Newer forms of prevention, such as TasP, are not explicitly addressed by 
any statute but could be argued to be relevant or dispositive under the 
                                                 
41 See 15 Ways HIV Criminalization Laws Harm Us All, supra note 5 (discussing difficulties with proving 
disclosure); see generally State-by-State Chart of HIV-Specific Statutes and Prosecutorial Tools, supra note 
2, at 1 (listing criminal statutes of thirty-two states). 
42 See, e.g., IND. CODE § 16-41-7-1 (2015) (“[S]exual or needle sharing contact that has been demonstrated 
epidemiologically to transmit [HIV]”); IOWA CODE §§ 709D.2–.3 (2015) (providing that “[a] person 
commits a [crime] when the person knows the person is infected with a contagious or infectious disease and 
exposes an uninfected person to the contagious or infectious disease . . . .” and defining “exposes” as 
“engaging in conduct that poses a substantial risk of transmission”); MINN. STAT. § 609.2241 (2015) 
(“[B]ehavior that has been demonstrated epidemiologically to be a mode of direct transmission of [HIV]”); 
NEV. REV STAT. § 201.205 (2014) (“[E]ngages in conduct in a manner that is intended or likely to transmit 
the disease to another person”); OKLA. STAT. tit. 21, § 1192.1 (2014) (“[E]ngage in conduct reasonably 
likely to result in the transfer of the person's own blood, bodily fluids containing visible blood, semen, or 
vaginal secretions into the bloodstream of another”); TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-13-109 (2015) (“[T]he 
exposure of the body of one person to a bodily fluid of another person in any manner that presents a 
significant risk of HIV . . . transmission”). 
43 See, e.g., GA. CODE ANN. § 16-5-60(c)(1) (LEXIS through 2015 Reg. Sess.) (“[A]ny sexual act involving 
the sex organs of one person and the mouth or anus of another person”); MICH. COMP. LAWS. § 333.5210(2) 
(2015) (“[S]exual intercourse, cunnilingus, fellatio, anal intercourse, or any other intrusion, however slight, 
of any part of a person’s body or of any object into the genital or anal openings of another person’s body, 
but emission of semen is not required”); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2907.01(A) (West 2006) (“[V]aginal 
intercourse between a male and female; anal intercourse, fellatio, and cunnilingus between persons 
regardless of sex”). 
44 See, e.g., CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 120291 (Deering, LEXIS through 2015 Sess.) (“Any person 
who exposes another to the human immunodeficiency virus (HIV) by engaging in unprotected sexual 
activity . . .”); 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/12-5.01(a)(1) (LexisNexis, LEXIS through P.A. 99-500 of 
2016 Reg. Legis. Sess.) (“A person commits criminal transmission of HIV when he or she . . . engages in 
sexual activity with another without the use of a condom . . . .”); IOWA CODE § 709D.3(7) (2015); id. 
§ 709D.2(3).  
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intent, risk, or mitigation prongs of some more nuanced statutes.45 The 
majority of HIV criminalization statutes, however, do not explicitly 
account for any prophylactic measures taken by either partner. 
(c) Intent requirements: Many states’ statutes have ambiguous intent 
language, which could require that the defendant have a specific intent to 
transmit HIV, but may only require that the sex act itself be intentional 
(i.e., that it was consensual on the part of the defendant).46 These statutes 
have often been interpreted to require only that the sex act be intentional.47 
Two states, however, provide for a graded approach where specific intent 
to transmit HIV is required to secure the highest felony conviction, and 
otherwise only a misdemeanor or lower-level felony conviction is 
available.48 
(d) Penalties: Potential prison sentences under HIV criminalization laws vary 
dramatically. Illinois is on the low end, with a three- to seven-year 
sentence.49 On the high end, Texas prosecutes people living with HIV 
under general criminal statutes rather than an HIV-specific one, and thus 
does not have an HIV-specific sentencing range.50 An example of that 
state’s approach in practice is a thirty-five-year prison sentence for spitting 
at a police officer—a zero-risk act.51 
2. Criticisms of HIV Criminalization 
There are many reasons to criticize HIV criminalization, from a public health 
perspective as well as from a criminal justice perspective.52 The most obvious, and 
                                                 
45 See, e.g., IOWA CODE § 709D.3 (2015) (risk: “[C]onduct that poses a substantial risk of transmission”); 
MINN. STAT. § 609.2241(3)(1) (2015) (mitigation: “[P]ractical means to prevent transmission as advised by 
a physician or other health professional”). To the extent that statutes require an intent to transmit HIV, see, 
e.g., CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE §§ 120291; IOWA CODE § 709D.3(1), defendants should argue that by 
maintaining an undetectable viral load, they show that their intent is not to transmit HIV. 
46 For example, the Illinois statute requires “specific intent to commit the offense,” see 720 ILL. COMP. 
STAT. ANN. 5/12-5.01(a) (LexisNexis, LEXIS through P.A. 99-500 of 2016 Reg. Legis. Sess.), and the 
Illinois Supreme Court has not yet decided whether that means intent to transmit HIV or merely intent to 
perform the acts enumerated in the statute.  
47 For example, in Louisiana, it is unlawful to "intentionally expose another to any acquired 
immunodeficiency syndrome (AIDS) virus through sexual contact without the knowing and lawful consent 
of the victim." LA. REV. STAT. § 14:43.5. However, Louisiana courts have held that intent to transmit HIV 
is not an element of the crime. See, e.g., State v. Roberts, 844 So. 2d 263, 271-72 (La. 2003).  
48 See CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE §§ 120290–120291 (Deering, LEXIS through 2015 Sess.); IOWA 
CODE § 709D.3(1)–(4) (2015). 
49 See 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/12-5.01(e) (LexisNexis, LEXIS through P.A. 99-500 of 2016 Reg. 
Legis. Sess.); 730 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/5-4.5-35 (LexisNexis, LEXIS through P.A. 99-500 of 2016 
Reg. Legis. Sess.).  
50 See generally ENDING & DEFENDING, supra note 3, at 226 (discussing case where man charged with 
aggravated assault for infecting women with HIV was sentenced to forty-five years’ imprisonment). 
51 See Gretel C. Kovach, Prison for Man with H.I.V. Who Spit on a Police Officer, N.Y. TIMES, May 16, 
2008, http://www.nytimes.com/2008/05/16/us/16spit.html. 
52 See, e.g., Margo Kaplan, Rethinking HIV-Exposure Crimes, 87 IND. L.J. 1517 (2012); Angela Perone, 
From Punitive to Proactive: An Alternative Approach for Responding to HIV Criminalization that Departs 
from Penalizing Marginalized Communities, 24 HASTINGS WOMEN’S L.J. 363 (2013); Joseph Allen 
Garmon, Note, The Laws of the Past Versus the Medicine of Today: Eradicating the Criminalization of 
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perhaps least controversial, criticism is that HIV criminalization laws are overbroad: the 
majority of HIV criminalization statutes punish conduct that poses no proven risk of HIV 
transmission, and these statutes do not distinguish between acts that pose very low or 
theoretical risks and acts that pose a demonstrated high risk.53 Additionally, as the 
understanding of HIV transmission risks has evolved to include considerations such as 
viral load, it has become increasingly impractical to categorize sex acts by risk level, 
even where statutes purport to do so.54 
Punishing harmless conduct is obviously unjust for the defendants in these cases, 
but it is also bad policy for another reason: it contributes to misinformation.55 Despite 
scientific consensus on how HIV can and cannot be transmitted, misconceptions about 
transmission remain rampant in the general population.56 It makes sense that when people 
see news stories about prison sentences for spitting at someone or for oral sex, they will 
falsely conclude that these acts must pose some risk of HIV transmission. The spread of 
such misinformation undermines attempts to educate people about real HIV transmission 
risks.57 
Why is that misinformation harmful? After all, it does not make people believe 
their high-risk acts are low-risk; it only makes people believe no-risk or very low-risk 
acts may be risky. This type of misinformation does increase risks, however. When 
people believe that HIV can be more easily spread than it actually can, they are more 
likely to avoid people living with HIV, both socially and sexually.58 This avoidance 
stigmatizes people living with HIV, and that stigma is a major barrier to HIV testing and 
other public health efforts.59 Stigma associated with HIV also creates a culture of silence 
among HIV-negative people that interferes with open conversation about prevention and 
actually leads to more high-risk behaviors among those at risk.60 
HIV criminalization interferes with prevention in other ways, too. Effective HIV 
prevention requires the engagement of people living with HIV, but also, more 
                                                 
HIV/AIDS, 57 HOW. L.J. 665 (2014); James B. McArthur, Note, As the Tide Turns: The Changing 
HIV/AIDS Epidemic and the Criminalization of HIV Exposure, 94 CORNELL L. REV. 707 (2009). 
53 See, e.g., GA. CODE ANN. § 16-5-60(c)(1) (LEXIS through 2015 Reg. Sess.) (criminalizing an HIV-
infected person’s engaging in “sexual intercourse or . . . any sexual act involving the sex organs of one 
person and the mouth or anus of another person,” thus including with no distinction everything from high-
risk unprotected receptive anal intercourse to no-risk insertive oral sex, with or without a condom); OHIO 
REV. CODE ANN. § 2907.01(A) (West 2006) (“[V]aginal intercourse between a male and female; anal 
intercourse, fellatio, and cunnilingus between persons regardless of sex”). 
54 See Kaplan, supra note 57, at 1540–43. 
55 Perone, supra note 57, at 383. 
56 See HIV/AIDS AT 30, supra note 25, at 6. 
57 See Perone, supra note 57, at 383–85. 
58 See generally HIV/AIDS AT 30, supra note 25, at 7 (finding a correlation between accurate responses to 
survey questions on HIV transmission and positive responses to survey questions on comfort with people 
living with HIV). 
59 See Perone, supra note 57, at 394; Ronald O. Valdiserri, HIV/AIDS Stigma: An Impediment to Public 
Health, 92 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 341, 341–342 (2002). 
60 See MARIA EKSTRAND, CTR. FOR AIDS PREVENTION STUDIES, UNIV. OF CAL. AT S.F., HOW DOES 
STIGMA AFFECT HIV PREVENTION AND TREATMENT? 1 (2006), 
http://caps.ucsf.edu/uploads/pubs/FS/pdf/stigmaFS.pdf; HIV Stigma, Treatment and Prevention, HIV & 
AIDS TREATMENT PRAC. (NAM Aidsmap, London, U.K.), Oct. 13, 2005, at 2, 4, 
http://www.aidsmap.com/pdf/HATIP-56-13th-October-2005/page/1037657/.  
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importantly, the engagement of HIV-negative individuals.61 Specifically, HIV-negative 
individuals at risk of contracting HIV must be encouraged to take responsibility for their 
own health, by any combination of considering PrEP or PEP, insisting on condom use, 
limiting sexual activity to low-risk or no-risk acts, and discussing HIV status and risks 
with sexual and needle-sharing partners.62 
HIV criminalization suggests the opposite, though, by putting the onus entirely on 
people living with HIV.63 This can create a false sense of security for the HIV-negative 
partner: if they understand that any HIV-positive sexual partner is legally obligated to 
proactively disclose his or her status, they may not raise the question themselves or take 
their own protective measures, since it is the HIV-positive partner’s “job” to do so.64 This 
line of thinking is dangerous and unrealistic for two reasons: many people with HIV do 
not know their status and thus cannot disclose it,65 and those who do know their status 
may nonetheless not always disclose it.66 
Additionally, though HIV criminalization laws mandate disclosure, their effects 
actually discourage disclosure,67 for two reasons. First, HIV criminalization contributes 
to stigma.68 By singling out people living with HIV as inherently dangerous or criminal, 
and necessitating criminal controls that other communicable diseases do not, these laws 
send a message of overt hostility to people living with HIV while fuelling irrational fear 
of HIV within the general population.69 In particular, most HIV criminalization laws are 
not based on actual risk of HIV transmission: they therefore send the message that sex 
with a person living with HIV is harmful in and of itself, or that people living with HIV 
are unclean or undesirable people.70  
Second, HIV criminalization laws discourage after-the-fact disclosure.71 As soon 
as a person living with HIV has had sex with someone once without disclosing his or her 
status, he or she has a strong interest in continuing to conceal it for fear of prosecution.72 
                                                 
61 See, e.g., WORLD HEALTH ORG., GLOBAL HEALTH SECTOR STRATEGY ON HIV/AIDS 2011–2015, at 11–
13 (2011),  http://whqlibdoc.who.int/publications/2011/9789241501651_eng.pdf?ua=1; Susan Kippax & 
Niamh Stephenson, Beyond the Distinction Between Biomedical and Social Dimensions of HIV: Prevention 
Through the Lens of a Social Public Health, 102 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 789, 789 (2012); Stella R. Quah, 
Ethnicity, HIV/AIDS Prevention and Public Health Education, 18 INT’L J. SOC. & SOC. POL’Y, no. 7/8, 
1998, at 1, 1–4. The underlying theme in all of these sources, and in most others dealing with HIV 
prevention, is that individuals and communities must be empowered to address and mitigate HIV risks, not 
that people living with HIV must simply stop spreading it. 
62 See generally HIV Prevention, CENTERS FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION, 
http://www.cdc.gov/hiv/basics/prevention.html (last updated Dec. 6, 2015). 
63 See 15 Ways HIV Criminalization Laws Harm Us All, supra note 5. 
64 See id. 
65 CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION, supra note 23, at 2. 
66 A 2012 study showed that awareness of an HIV criminalization statute has no effect on the likelihood of 
a person living with HIV disclosing his or her status to sexual partners. See Carol L. Galletly et al., New 
Jersey's HIV Exposure Law and the HIV-Related Attitudes, Beliefs, and Sexual and Seropositive Status 
Disclosure Behaviors of Persons Living With HIV, 102 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 2135, 2135 (2012). 
67 See generally 15 Ways HIV Criminalization Laws Harm Us All, supra note 5. 
68 Kaplan, supra note 57, at 1535–36. 
69 See id. 
70 See id. 
71 See 15 Ways HIV Criminalization Laws Harm Us All, supra note 5. 
72 See id. 
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This is counterproductive, as after-the-fact disclosure would allow the HIV-negative 
partner to use PEP to mitigate the risk of becoming infected from the first encounter, and 
would also allow the HIV-negative partner to make an informed decision for future 
encounters. Instead, HIV criminalization makes later disclosures riskier, therefore 
incentivizing continued secrecy. 
HIV criminalization also ignores the current reality of HIV treatment.73 With 
proper treatment, an HIV diagnosis has relatively little impact on life expectancy or 
quality of life.74 Treating HIV transmission as a “death sentence” or a form of aggravated 
physical assault simply does not make logical sense, given the advanced treatment 
options available today,75 any more than it would make sense to attach harsh criminal 
penalties to acts that put an individual at risk for any other illness. For example, high 
blood pressure, heart disease, and diabetes all have a greater impact on life expectancy 
than HIV,76 but criminal sanctions generally do not apply to conduct that puts people at 
risk for these conditions. Though HIV treatment carries a substantial financial cost, this is 
best addressed at the population level through prevention efforts and government 
assistance, much like the other expensive chronic health conditions just mentioned—not 
at the individual level through criminal sanctions.  
Significantly, HIV criminalization statutes deviate substantially from the policy 
norms that underlie most areas of criminal law.77 Under most criminal statutes, an actor’s 
conduct must actually cause harm, not just create a risk of harm.78 For example, for a 
defendant to be guilty of criminal homicide under the Model Penal Code (MPC), the 
victim must actually die, and must die from the attack;79 otherwise, the crime is only 
attempted criminal homicide.80 Under all but one HIV criminalization statute, however, it 
makes no difference whether the victim actually contracts HIV;81 indeed, in most HIV 
cases that have been prosecuted, the victim did not contract the virus.82 
                                                 
73 See McArthur, supra note 57, at 731–32. 
74 See Barré-Sinoussi, supra note 1, at 879; Loutfy et al., supra note 29, at 138. 
75 See McArthur, supra note 57, at 731–33. 
76 See Barré-Sinoussi, supra note 1, at 879; Loufty et al., supra note 29, at 138. See also Haomiao Jia et al., 
The Effects of Diabetes, Hypertension, Asthma, Heart Disease, and Stroke on Quality-Adjusted Life 
Expectancy, 16 VALUE HEALTH 140, 142 tbl. 1 (2013) (finding losses in life expectancy of 3.1 years for 
high blood pressure, 6.8 years for heart disease, and 9 years for diabetes before further adjustments for 
quality of life). 
77 See Kaplan, supra note 57, at 1520–21, 1539–46 (discussing the poor fit between HIV criminalization 
statutes and principles of mens rea and actus reus). 
78 See generally MODEL PENAL CODE §§ 2.02–.03 (AM. LAW INST. 1962).  
79 See id. § 210.1 (“A person is guilty of criminal homicide if he purposely, knowingly, recklessly or 
negligently causes the death of another human being.”). 
80 See generally id. § 5.01. 
81 Iowa’s new HIV criminalization statute, enacted in 2014, is the only one that makes a distinction based 
on whether transmission actually occurs. See IOWA CODE § 709D.3 (2015).  
82 There is no definitive way to track every HIV case that has ever been prosecuted. However, a survey of 
cases known by the Center for HIV Law and Policy shows that very few involve actual transmission. See 
Prosecutions and Arrests for HIV Exposure in the United States, 2008–2015, CTR. FOR HIV L. & POL’Y 
(June 30, 2015), 
http://www.hivlawandpolicy.org/sites/www.hivlawandpolicy.org/files/ArrestsandProsecutionsforHIVExpo
sureintheU.S.2008-2015revised6.30.15.pdf [hereinafter Prosecutions and Arrests].  
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Similarly, intent is a crucial element of most criminal offenses. To be guilty of 
murder—the highest gradation of criminal homicide under the MPC—a defendant must 
cause the victim’s death purposely, knowingly, or “recklessly under circumstances 
manifesting extreme indifference to . . . human life.”83 Lower levels of intent—ordinary 
recklessness or negligence—only support a conviction for manslaughter or negligent 
homicide,84  which carry lighter sentences. But again, with only two exceptions (Iowa 
and California), HIV criminalization statutes do not differentiate based on different levels 
of intent.85 Some statutes’ intent requirements are ambiguous, and the rule of lenity urges 
that they should be interpreted in defendants’ favor. Nonetheless, in many cases it 
suffices that the defendant had HIV and intended to have sex, whether or not he or she 
intended to transmit HIV.86 Indeed, in many states, even affirmative acts to prevent 
transmission (e.g., condom use) do not affect the analysis, at least not under the plain 
language of the statute.87 While homicide tends to have more intent-related gradations 
than other criminal offenses, the general principle that intent matters is reflected in most 
criminal laws: the MPC includes a presumption that a mens rea of recklessness is 
required for all crimes, unless a different requirement is specified.88 Under most HIV 
criminalization laws, however, there is a mens rea requirement for the physical act that is 
committed (the sex act itself must be voluntary), but no mens rea requirement at all for 
the harm that these statutes purportedly seek to address: the risk of HIV transmission. 
The current approach to HIV criminalization in most states is akin to a murder 
statute in which the defendant must intentionally pull the trigger or thrust the knife, but 
need not intend to cause death nor actually cause death: the person living with HIV must 
intentionally have sex, but need neither intend to, nor actually, transmit HIV. The 
“murder” weapon could be an unloaded gun, or a knife too dull to cause injury: the sex 
act could be no-risk, or the defendant could have an undetectable viral load. Finally, it is 
immaterial if the defendant acts to protect the victim by calling 9-1-1 or treating the 
wound: many HIV criminalization statutes do not have a defense for wearing a condom, 
                                                 
83 MODEL PENAL CODE § 210.2 (AM. LAW INST. 1962). 
84 See id. §§ 210.3–.4. 
85 Iowa’s new law distinguishes between “intent” to transmit HIV and “reckless disregard” for a risk of 
transmitting HIV and does not criminalize any conduct that falls below the standard of reckless disregard. 
See IOWA CODE § 709D.3(1)–(4) (2015). California’s law requires “specific intent to infect the other 
person” for a felony conviction, see CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 120291 (Deering, LEXIS through 
2015 Sess.), and alternatively provides for a misdemeanor conviction for willful exposure, see id. 
§ 120290. 
86 See, e.g., GA. CODE ANN. § 16-5-60(c) (LEXIS through 2015 Reg. Sess.) (requiring the defendant to 
knowingly engage in various acts, but not requiring the defendant to knowingly or purposefully create a 
risk of HIV transmission). This language is typical of many HIV criminalization statutes in other states. 
See, e.g., N.D. CENT. CODE § 12.1-20-17 (2015) (requiring the defendant to willfully engage in specified 
acts, but not requiring any mens rea for transmission risk); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2903.11(B) (West 
2006) (requiring the defendant to knowingly engage in various acts, but requiring no mens rea with regard 
to transmission risk). 
87 See, e.g., ARK. CODE ANN. § 5-14-123 (LEXIS through 2015 Reg. Sess.); GA. CODE ANN. § 16-5-60(c) 
(LEXIS through 2015 Reg. Sess.); IDAHO CODE § 39-608 (2015); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 21-5424 (West 
2012); MICH. COMP. LAWS § 333.5210 (2015); MO. REV. STAT. § 191.677(4) (2015); OHIO REV. CODE 
ANN. § 2903.11 (West 2006); S.C. CODE ANN. § 44-29-145 (2015); VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-67.4:1 (West 
2012). 
88 See MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.02(3) (AM. LAW INST. 1962). 
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and none have a defense for warning the other party to take PEP afterwards. Such 
departures from ordinary principles of criminal law lead to unjust prosecutions and 
convictions, and strongly suggest that HIV criminalization reflects animus toward people 
living with HIV and fear of the virus more than reasoned policymaking. 
Finally, nearly half of new infections today originate with individuals who do not 
know their HIV status,89 even though those individuals represent only 18% of the total 
population living with HIV.90 Because those individuals are not receiving treatment, they 
will generally have higher viral loads and thus be more infectious; and because they do 
not know their HIV status, they cannot disclose it to their partners or encourage their 
partners to use protective measures. HIV criminalization laws do not apply to individuals 
who do not know their HIV status, and thus can have no deterrent effect on the highest-
risk population or conduct. Therefore, if preventing HIV transmission is the goal, the 
focus should be on encouraging people who do not know their HIV status to be tested and 
to begin treatment. HIV criminalization likely hampers that goal, and at best, it certainly 
does not help.91 
III.  IOWA CHANGES COURSE 
A.  Iowa Law Before Rhoades 
 Iowa’s old HIV criminalization law—the law at issue in Rhoades—was one of the 
most draconian in the country. It was passed in 1998,92 and it criminalized “the 
intentional exposure of the body of one person to a bodily fluid of another person in a 
manner that could result in the transmission of the human immunodeficiency virus.”93 
The only affirmative defense was if: 
[T]he person exposed to the human immunodeficiency virus knew that the 
infected person had a positive human immunodeficiency virus status at the 
time of the action of exposure, knew that the action of exposure could result 
in transmission of the human immunodeficiency virus, and consented to the 
action of exposure with that knowledge.94 
There was no affirmative defense for wearing condoms or for any other protective 
measure. Advocates argued that wearing condoms negated the “intent” component of 
                                                 
89 H. Irene Hall, et. al., HIV transmission rates from persons living with HIV who are aware and unaware 
of their infection, 26 AIDS 883, 883 (2012).  
90 CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION, supra note 23, at 2. 
91 See BEST PRACTICES GUIDE, supra note 26, at 2; see also 15 Ways HIV Criminalization Laws Harm Us 
All, supra note 5. 
92 See Act of Apr. 13, 1998, ch. 1087, § 7, 1998 Iowa Acts 146, 149 (repealed 2014).  
93 Id.  
94 Id. at 149–50. 
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“intentional exposure,” but to no avail.95 The offense was a class “B” felony, carrying a 
maximum sentence of twenty-five years.96  
 Until Rhoades, the Iowa courts gave the statute a particularly harsh construction, 
employing an “any risk” standard that allowed conviction for essentially any sex act, 
even if the risk was no more than theoretical.97 Furthermore, the Iowa Supreme Court 
allowed convictions based on judicial notice, the principle that courts can find certain 
facts based on common knowledge rather than requiring the State to prove them beyond a 
reasonable doubt. In the case of the HIV statute, this meant that courts would assume that 
sexual conduct could transmit HIV, rather than requiring the State to prove on a case-
specific basis that specific sex acts could transmit the virus in specific circumstances.98 
Thus, prosecutors were relieved of the burden of actually showing that a defendant’s 
conduct could have transmitted HIV, leaving defense counsel with very few options for 
effectively defending such cases. 
B.  Rhoades v. State 
1. Background 
 
 In 2008, against the legal backdrop described above, Nick Rhoades, an Iowa man 
living with HIV, had a one-time sexual encounter with Adam Plendl, who was HIV-
negative.99 Rhoades had an undetectable viral load at the time, rendering any sex act 
extremely low-risk or possibly even no-risk.100 Rhoades performed oral sex without a 
condom on Plendl, which is a no-risk act, and performed anal sex with a condom, which 
is a very low-risk act (even without considering the further mitigating effect of Rhoades’s 
undetectable viral load).101 When Plendl learned of Rhoades’s HIV status, he had 
Rhoades prosecuted.102 Rhoades pled guilty on advice of counsel and received the 
maximum sentence of twenty-five years in prison and lifetime registration as a sex 
offender.103 
In 2010, Rhoades filed a petition for post-conviction relief, which was denied by 
the district court.104 Lambda Legal became involved and represented Rhoades in the Iowa 
                                                 
95 See Rhoades v. State, No. 12-0180, 2013 Iowa App. LEXIS 1048, at *9–11 (Iowa Ct. App. Oct. 2, 2013), 
vacated, 848 N.W.2d 22 (Iowa 2014). 
96 § 7, 1998 Iowa Acts at 149 (designating the offense as a class “B” felony); see also  IOWA CODE 
§ 902.9(1)(b) (2015) (indicating maximum twenty-five year sentence for a class “B” felony). 
97 See, e.g., State v. Keene, 629 N.W.2d 360, 365 (Iowa 2001) (“[I]t must simply be shown that 
transmission of the HIV from the infected person to the exposed person was possible considering the 
circumstances.”). 
98 See id. at 365–66. 
99 See Rhoades v. State, 848 N.W.2d 22, 25–26 (Iowa 2014). 
100 Id. at 25 (calling Rhoades’s HIV viral load “nondetectable”); see also discussion supra Section II.A 
(regarding risk levels). 
101 Rhoades, 848 N.W.2d at 25–26; see discussion supra Section II.A (regarding risk levels). 
102 See Rhoades, 848 N.W.2d at 26. 
103 Id. 
104 Id. 
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Court of Appeals,105 where the district court’s decision was affirmed.106 In late 2013, 
Rhoades and Lambda Legal chose to appeal the decision.107 The Supreme Court of Iowa 
granted certiorari in January 2014, heard oral arguments in March 2014, and ruled in June 
2014.108 
i. Supreme Court Decision 
 
 The Supreme Court of Iowa vacated Rhoades’s conviction for two reasons: (i) 
that the language in the statute carried an implied reasonableness requirement precluding 
conviction on extremely low or theoretical risks,109 and (ii) that current science precluded 
a finding by judicial notice that Rhoades’s and Plendl’s acts met the requisite risk level to 
transmit HIV.110 
The court began its analysis with a statutory interpretation exercise focused on the 
words “could” and “possible.”111 As discussed above, the statute required “intentional 
exposure . . . to a bodily fluid . . . in a manner that could result in the transmission of 
HIV.”112 The Court noted that based on its prior case law, “could” meant “that 
transmission of . . . HIV . . . was possible considering the circumstances.”113 The court 
then considered two competing definitions of “possible”: a broad definition that included 
the highly improbable and the merely theoretical, and a narrower definition that requires 
“an indicated potential by nature or circumstances” and carries a reasonableness 
requirement.114 Though the court stated that it had not previously chosen between the two 
definitions,115 as a practical matter it had historically followed the broad definition, which 
is effectively an “any risk” standard.116 
After surveying a range of case law that used both definitions, the court decided 
that the narrower definition was more appropriate.117 First, the court noted that medical 
experts testifying to HIV transmission risks “are not required to testify in absolutes.”118 
                                                 
105 Rhoades v. Iowa, LAMBDA LEGAL, http://www.lambdalegal.org/in-court/cases/rhoades-v-iowa (last 
visited Feb. 6, 2016). 
106 See Rhoades v. State, No. 12-0180, 2013 Iowa App. LEXIS 1048, at *11 (Iowa Ct. App. Oct. 2, 2013), 
vacated, 848 N.W.2d 22 (Iowa 2014). With no exploration of scientific evidence on the actual risks of oral 
sex and no discussion of the significance of an undetectable viral load, the court held that “oral sex is a well 
recognized means of transmission of HIV.” Id. at *7. The court also held that even though the statute 
requires that the defendant “intentionally expose” his bodily fluid, it was irrelevant whether or not he even 
ejaculated, as any unprotected oral sex demonstrates a per se intent to expose. See id. at *11. 
107 See Rhoades v. Iowa, supra note 112. 
108 Id. 
109 See Rhoades v. State, 848 N.W.2d 22, 27–28 (Iowa 2014). 
110 Id. at 32–33. 
111 See id. at 27. 
112 Id.  
113 Id. (quoting State v. Keene, 629 N.W.2d 360, 365 (Iowa 2001)). 
114 Id.  
115 See  Rhoades, 848 N.W.2d at 27. 
116 The “any risk” standard can be inferred from conviction under the virtually no-risk facts of State v. 
Keene, 629 N.W.2d 360, 362–63 (Iowa 2001), as well as from the appellate court’s ruling in Rhoades v. 
State, 840 N.W.2d 726 (Iowa Ct. App. 2013). 
117 See Rhoades, 848 N.W.2d at 27–28. 
118 Id. at 28. 
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This somewhat obtuse comment implicitly acknowledged a challenge HIV advocates 
have long faced under “any risk” standards: it is very difficult to have an expert testify 
that a specific act under specific circumstances poses absolutely no risk. In strict 
scientific terms, even the most attenuated, unlikely, and theoretical risks are not actually 
no-risk, meaning that even when conduct is no-risk for all practical purposes, it is 
exceedingly difficult to defend under an “any risk” standard. Second, the court noted that 
as a policy matter, it would be undesirable to allow convictions based on risks that are no 
more than theoretical.119 
 Having established that something more than a theoretical possibility of 
transmission is required to secure a conviction, the court turned to whether the record 
contained evidence to support the conviction under that standard. Because Rhoades had 
pled guilty, the analysis was framed by whether there was a sufficient factual basis to 
support his guilty plea.120 The only factual basis in Rhoades’s guilty plea was his 
agreement that he had engaged in “intimate contact.”121 The court determined that this 
simply meant that some form of sexual activity had occurred, and not that the conduct 
necessarily fit the statutory definition of “intimate contact” as sexual activity that “could 
transmit HIV.”122 
The court next looked to minutes of testimony, including police reports containing 
Plendl’s statements.123 The court noted that this testimony established that Rhoades 
performed oral and anal sex on Plendl, and that a condom was used during anal sex.124 
The testimony did not establish that bodily fluids had been exchanged or that Rhoades 
had “intentionally exposed” Plendl to any bodily fluids.125 
Finally, and most importantly, the court turned to the doctrine of judicial 
notice.126 A court may take judicial notice of an adjudicative fact if it is either “generally 
known within the territorial jurisdiction of the trial court” or “capable of accurate and 
ready determination by resort to sources whose accuracy cannot reasonably be 
questioned.”127 The court noted that findings by judicial notice are case-specific, so 
previous cases where the possibility of HIV transmission was judicially noticed do not 
control future proceedings.128 
Having established that judicial notice was the only way to find that Rhoades’s 
conduct could transmit HIV, and that previous judicial notice of similar facts in similar 
cases was not controlling, the court examined the current state of knowledge about HIV 
transmission.129 
                                                 
119 Id.  
120 See id. at 28–29. 
121 See id. at 29–30. 
122 See id. at 30. 
123 Id. at 30–31. 
124 Id. at 31. 
125 Id. 
126 See id.  
127 Id. (quoting IOWA R. EVID. 5.201(b)). 
128 See id. 
129 See id. at 32. 
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The court began by acknowledging that science had progressed significantly since 
the court had last commented on the issue in 2003.130 Discussing the specific acts of 
Rhoades and Plendl, the court held that it was “unable to take judicial notice that an 
infected individual can transmit HIV when [he] engages in protected anal sex . . . or 
unprotected oral sex, regardless of [his] viral load.”131 Though that holding alone was 
dispositive, the court went further to note that “there is a question of whether . . . a person 
with a nondetectable viral load could transmit HIV . . . or whether transmission was 
merely theoretical.”132 
ii. Analysis of the Holding 
 
The court’s holding explicitly barred judicial notice of protected anal sex and 
unprotected oral sex as acts that could transmit HIV.133 It also, independently, barred 
judicial notice of any act by a person with an undetectable viral load as an act that could 
transmit HIV.134 
This signifies a major step forward in judicial recognition of modern science: 
never before has a state’s high court held that those sex acts are too low-risk to be 
criminalized, nor has a state’s high court ever before recognized the significance of an 
undetectable viral load. Historically, courts have tended to assume that all sex acts can 
transmit HIV, without seriously surveying scientific knowledge.135 We now know, and 
the Iowa Supreme Court has now recognized, that many of the acts we once criminalized 
pose such a trivial risk that punishing them is inappropriate.  
However, the court’s holding only bars a conviction by judicial notice for oral 
sex, protected anal sex, or individuals with an undetectable viral load, not any conviction 
under those circumstances. Thus, theoretically, the prosecution could introduce evidence 
to persuade the fact-finder that such acts pose a reasonable risk of transmitting HIV. 
Despite the weight of modern scientific evidence to the contrary, jury decisions are 
unpredictable, especially given the substantial stigma and misconceptions that continue to 
surround HIV.136 However, Iowa has chosen not to re-prosecute Rhoades, and any future 
prosecutions will occur under a changed statutory landscape. 
 
C. Concurrent Legislative Reform in Iowa 
On May 30, 2014, just two weeks before Rhoades was decided, Governor Terry 
Branstad signed into law Senate File 2297, An Act Relating to the Criminal Transmission 
of a Contagious or Infectious Disease, Providing Penalties, and Including Effective Date 
                                                 
130 See id.  
131 Id. 
132 Id. at 33. 
133 Id. at 32.  
134 Id.  
135 For example, many of the cases listed in Prosecutions and Arrests, supra note 88, involve very low-risk 
or no-risk conduct, and very few of these cases include a rigorous scientific analysis of transmission risk. 
136 See 15 Ways HIV Criminalization Laws Harm Us All, supra note 5 (“Convictions may be strongly 
influenced . . . by jurors’ moral disapproval.”). 
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Provisions.137 This Act repealed the old HIV criminalization law under which Rhoades 
had been convicted138 and enacted a new scheme that was widely supported by HIV 
advocates.139 
1. Key features of the new law 
 
The new law applies not only to HIV but also to hepatitis and meningococcal 
disease.140 This change represents an important recognition that based on treatment 
options that exist today, HIV no longer merits being singled out for harsher treatment 
than other contagious diseases. 
The new law also allows for conviction only when conduct poses a “substantial 
risk” of transmitting an enumerated contagious disease.141 The term “substantial risk” is 
not further defined, but based on the common usage meaning of the term, it is 
presumably a higher standard than the “reasonable risk” standard adopted by the court in 
Rhoades—or, at worst, is identical to that standard. As such, the new standard must at the 
very least exclude purely theoretical risks, such as those at play in Rhoades. By 
establishing this standard, the legislature recognized the same principle that the court did 
when it reinterpreted the old statute: that as a matter of criminal policy, it is undesirable 
to punish conduct that may not pose any genuine risk to others.142 
The law provides for four gradations in the offense, with separate sentencing 
provisions, based on the intent of the actor and the result of the conduct.143 This brings 
the new law more into line with general principles of criminal law. The harshest penalty, 
a maximum of twenty-five years in prison, is reserved for cases where the defendant 
specifically intended to transmit HIV (i.e., not just intended to engage in conduct that 
could result in transmission) and where transmission did in fact occur.144 Conviction 
under this standard is very difficult: the majority of HIV criminalization cases involve 
                                                 
137 Andrew D. Forsyth, Iowa Modernizes HIV Criminalization Law, AIDS.GOV: BLOGS.AIDS.GOV (June 2, 
2014), http://blog.aids.gov/2014/06/iowa-modernizes-hiv-criminalization-law.html; see also Contagious or 
Infectious Disease Transmission Act, ch. 1119, 2014 Iowa Acts 352 (codified as amended at IOWA CODE 
§ 709D (2015)). 
138 See § 9, 2014 Iowa Acts at 354.  
139 See Forsyth, supra note 144; Breaking News: Historic HIV Bill Passes Iowa House Unanimously, ONE 
IOWA (May 1, 2014), http://oneiowa.org/2014/05/breaking-news-historic-hiv-bill-passes-iowa-house-
unanimously/ (noting support for the bill by Iowa’s main LGBT and HIV advocacy organizations); see also 
Alison Gowans, New HIV Transmission Law Makes Iowa Model for Nation, GAZETTE (June 3, 2014), 
http://thegazette.com/subject/news/new-hiv-transmission-law-makes-iowa-model-for-nation-20140529 
(noting the broad coalition of groups supporting reform); Sergio Hernandez, HIV Is Not a Crime: The 
Aftermath of HIV Criminalization Advocacy in Iowa, POZ MAG., Oct.-Nov. 2014, at 44, 45–47, 
http://www.poz.com/articles/HIV_Not_a_Crime_conference_2881_26228.shtml (discussing the legislative 
process).   
140 See IOWA CODE § 709D.2(1) (2015). 
141 See id. § 709D.2(2) (defining the term “exposes” as “engaging in conduct that poses a substantial risk of 
transmission”).  
142 See Rhoades v. State, 848 N.W.2d 22, 28 (Iowa 2014) (“[W]e would not want to deprive a person of his 
or her liberty on the basis the defendant's actions caused something that can only theoretically occur.”). 
143 See IOWA CODE § 709D.3 (2015). 
144 See id. § 709D.3(1) (designating actual transmission with specific intent a class “B” felony); id. 
§ 902.9(1)(b) (prescribing twenty-five-year maximum sentence for class “B” felons). 
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neither actual transmission nor specific intent.145 If, however, the defendant had the 
specific intent to transmit but actual transmission did not occur, the maximum sentence is 
five years.146 Next, if the defendant acted with reckless disregard resulting in actual 
transmission, the maximum sentence is also five years.147 Finally, if the defendant acts 
with reckless disregard and actual transmission does not occur (likely the most common 
scenario), the offense is only a misdemeanor carrying a maximum sentence of one 
year.148 
In addition, a new affirmative defense was added for defendants who take 
“practical means to prevent transmission,”149 which is defined as:  
[S]ubstantial good-faith compliance with a treatment regimen prescribed by 
the person's health care provider, if applicable, and with behavioral 
recommendations of the person's health care provider or public health 
officials, which may include but are not limited to the use of a medically 
indicated respiratory mask or a prophylactic device, to measurably limit the 
risk of transmission of the contagious or infectious disease.150  
This is a considerably more open-ended provision than the risk mitigation defenses that 
exist in most other jurisdictions, and has the potential to keep pace with evolving 
prevention methods and recommendations including TasP. In other jurisdictions, risk 
mitigation defenses are generally limited to condom use, if they exist at all.151  
Although the legislature came to a conclusion similar to the court’s in terms of 
prosecutable risk levels, it ultimately went much further than the court could have. Iowa 
made itself an example for reform nationwide by making the statute no longer HIV-
specific, heightening the risk requirement, creating a new affirmative defense, and 
providing for graded offenses.152 While the old approach to HIV criminalization was out 
of line with ordinary criminal law principles, this new approach is consistent with the 
MPC approach to other crimes such as homicide. As the MPC recommends for most 
other crimes, distinctions now exist based on the actor’s intent to transmit HIV and on 
whether there was attempted or actual transmission. 
                                                 
145 See BEST PRACTICES GUIDE, supra note 26, at 2 (“[I]ntentional HIV transmission is atypical and 
uncommon”); see also Prosecutions and Arrests, supra note 88 (listing known recent HIV prosecutions, 
very few of which involve actual transmission). 
146 See IOWA CODE § 709D.3(2) (2015) (designating specific intent without transmission a class “D” 
felony); id. § 902.9(1)(e) (prescribing five-year maximum sentence for class “D” felons). 
147 See id. § 709D.3(3) (2015) (designating transmission with reckless disregard a class “D” felony); id. 
§ 902.9(1)(e)  (prescribing five-year maximum sentence for class “D” felons). 
148 See id. § 709D.3(4) (2015) (designating reckless disregard but no transmission a “serious 
misdemeanor”); id. § 903.1(1)(b) (prescribing one-year maximum sentence for serious misdemeanors). 
149 See id. § 709D.3(7). 
150 Id. § 709D.2(3). 
151 Of other HIV criminalization statutes, only Minnesota’s contains a similarly open-ended provision. See 
MINN. STAT. § 609.2241(3)(1) (2015). A few other statutes contain an affirmative defense for wearing a 
condom, or state condomless sex as an element of the crime. Under most other statutes, however, informed 
consent is the only affirmative defense.  
152 See Gowans, supra note 146. 
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2. Role of the Rhoades case in bringing about reform 
 
Nick Rhoades’s story was pivotal in bringing about legislative change in Iowa. 
The circumstances of Rhoades—the harsh penalty combined with the incredibly low risk 
of Rhoades’s acts actually transmitting HIV—brought a national spotlight on the Iowa 
law, attracting the attention of national organizations like Lambda Legal and the Center 
for HIV Law and Policy.153 Meanwhile, Rhoades’s conviction, along with a similar case a 
year later, galvanized local HIV and LGBT activists in Iowa to focus their activism on 
criminal law reform.154 
Those efforts ultimately resulted in the development of the new law, which was 
written with the input of national and local advocacy organizations and supported by the 
Iowa Department of Public Health.155 Broad support for the new law helped it to pass 
unanimously in both houses of the Iowa legislature.156 
IV.  IMPLICATIONS OF RHOADES V. STATE 
 If the most liberal reading of Rhoades (i.e., that oral sex, protected anal sex, and 
any act by an individual with an undetectable viral load are all too low-risk to prosecute) 
were applied as binding precedent in all states, the range of individuals and acts subject to 
criminalization would decrease dramatically nationwide. Exempting individuals with an 
undetectable viral load from HIV criminalization would reduce the number of individuals 
affected by 30%: the CDC estimates that 902,000 Americans know that they have HIV, 
of which 275,000 have an undetectable viral load.157 Moreover, though there are no 
comprehensive statistics on what proportion of prosecutions relate to oral sex, protected 
anal sex, or even lower-risk activities such as spitting or biting, such prosecutions appear 
to be relatively commonplace compared to prosecutions for higher-risk acts.158 
However, the picture is far more complex. Even in Iowa, legislative reform leaves 
some question as to how the holding will apply to future prosecutions. Rhoades is not 
binding outside Iowa, and its value as persuasive precedent is weaker in states whose 
statutes contain significantly different language.159 On the other hand, the court’s 
reasoning may have significant persuasive force on both legislatures and courts 
                                                 
153 See Hernandez, supra note 146, at 46 (stating that the Center for HIV Law and Policy and Lambda were 
involved in the legislative reform); see also Catherine Hanssens & Iván Espinoza-Madrigal, HIV 
Criminalization in Iowa: Rhoades v. Iowa, CTR. FOR HIV L. & POL’Y: THE FINE PRINT BLOG (Oct. 4, 
2013), http://www.hivlawandpolicy.org/fine-print-blog/hiv-criminalization-iowa-rhoades-v-iowa (stating 
that the Center for HIV Law and Policy filed an amicus brief in the case); Rhoades v. Iowa, supra note 105 
(stating that Lambda represented Rhoades on appeal). 
154 See Hernandez, supra note 146, at 46. 
155 See id. 
156 See Gowans, supra note 146. 
157 CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION, supra note 23. 
158 See generally Prosecutions and Arrests, supra note 88. 
159 While the old Iowa statute referred to conduct that “could transmit” HIV, many states’ statutes simply 
list covered acts, without requiring a case-by-case factual determination of whether transmission was 
possible. See supra Section II.B.1; see also sources cited supra note 47 (providing examples of state 
statutes). 
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elsewhere, even in states where the statutory language does not lend itself to direct 
comparison. 
Finally, while Rhoades places constraints on the prosecution of extremely low-
risk activities, it suggests no such constraints on higher-risk activities, even though 
convincing arguments exist that criminal sanctions are not an effective tool for HIV 
prevention regardless of the risk level of the activities in question. 
A.  Applicability of Rhoades to the New Iowa Law 
Because the new law requires a “substantial risk” of transmission,160 whereas the 
old law required only conduct that “could . . . transmi[t]” HIV,161 it is yet to be seen how, 
or if, the court’s precedent in Rhoades constrains courts implementing the new law. The 
Rhoades court reinterpreted “could transmit” as a reasonable risk standard;162 the 
substantial risk standard may be tougher to meet, but at worst is equivalent. Thus, at the 
very least, the acts for which Nick Rhoades was prosecuted should not be prosecutable 
under the new law. Even without Rhoades, those acts—protected anal sex, unprotected 
oral sex, and any sex act with an undetectable viral load—should not be prosecutable 
under the plain language of the new law: 
(a) Sex acts with a condom are exempted under the “practical means” 
affirmative defense;163 
(b) Sex acts by a person with an undetectable viral load should be 
exempted under the “substantial risk” requirement164 as well as 
under the “practical means” affirmative defense;165 and 
(c) Any sex act other than anal or vaginal sex should be exempted under 
the “substantial risk” requirement, as there is no demonstrated risk 
level for oral sex or any non-insertive act.166 
Even though as explained above, acts like those in Rhoades should be outside the 
scope of the new law regardless of the court’s precedent, Rhoades has the important 
practical effect of putting prosecutors, judges, defense attorneys, and people living with 
HIV on notice that those scenarios cannot be criminalized. As powerful as the 
“substantial risk” and “practical means” standards are, they are only as strong as the legal 
community’s knowledge of HIV transmission and prevention. Misconceptions about how 
                                                 
160 See IOWA CODE § 709D.2(3) (2015). 
161 See Act of Apr. 13, 1998, ch. 1087, § 7, 1998 Iowa Acts 146, 149 (repealed 2014). 
162 See Rhoades v. State, 848 N.W.2d 22, 27–28 (Iowa 2014). 
163 See IOWA CODE § 709D.2(3) (2015) (“Practical means to prevent transmission . . . may include . . . the 
use of . . . a prophylactic device.”); id. § 709D.3(7).  
164 See id. § 709D.2(2); see generally Loutfy et al., supra note 29, at 137 (stating that risk in vaginal 
intercourse “approaches zero” with an undetectable viral load and noting significant risk reduction but 
further study needed for anal intercourse); Rodger, supra note 40 (reporting no transmissions in over at 
least 16,400 male-male exposures and 14,000 male-female exposures). 
165 See IOWA CODE § 709D.2(3) (2015) (“Practical means to prevent transmission means substantial good 
faith compliance with a treatment regimen . . . and with behavioral recommendations . . . to measurably 
limit the risk of transmission of the contagious or infectious disease.”); id. § 709D.3(7); see also sources 
cited supra note 171. The impact of an undetectable viral load can be framed passively as not meeting the 
risk threshold, or it can be framed actively as an affirmative step taken by the individual to prevent 
transmission. 
166 See generally Loutfy et al., supra note 29, at 137. 
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HIV can be transmitted remain rampant,167 and there is no evidence that the legal 
community is any more knowledgeable than the general population on these matters. 
Indeed, the background to Rhoades suggests that the legal community is largely 
unfamiliar with HIV transmission risks: Iowa prosecutors pursued the case, Rhoades’s 
original defense counsel advised him to plead guilty, and the trial judge accepted that 
plea, all despite the virtual non-existence of any transmission risk.168 It took the 
involvement of a national impact organization, two more losses in court, and finally the 
intervention of the state’s highest court to overturn the conviction—a process no 
defendant should have to experience again. 
As a result, even if it is not necessarily legally determinative under the new law, 
Rhoades remains strategically significant. Hopefully, the court’s precedent will prevent 
futile prosecutions of cases similar to Rhoades before they even happen. But if not, at 
least prosecutors and judges are aware that risk must be proven and cannot be assumed 
by the courts, at least not for extremely low-risk acts. Moreover, many people living with 
HIV in Iowa will now be aware of Rhoades and will be in a better position to defend 
themselves in court if needed. Given the financial and emotional cost of criminal 
proceedings and the stress of living under even the threat of prosecution, the clarity 
provided by Rhoades improves the quality of life of people living with HIV throughout 
Iowa. 
B. Impact outside Iowa 
 If harnessed effectively by advocates, the changes in Iowa, both judicial and 
legislative, could be the first domino to fall in a national movement to end HIV 
criminalization.169 Advocates across the country are pushing for the repeal or substantial 
reform of HIV criminalization laws,170 and the Centers for Disease Control and 
Prevention and the Department of Justice have recently joined the chorus calling for 
change.171 
The role of Rhoades in that effort will vary significantly from state to state. Some 
states have HIV-specific statutes that explicitly incorporate a concept of risk or 
possibility,172 as the old Iowa statute did, while others use general criminal laws that also 
carry some sort of risk requirement.173 The application of Rhoades as persuasive 
precedent is most straightforward in these states. In states where statutes are worded in 
                                                 
167 See HIV/AIDS AT 30, supra note 25, at 6. 
168 See Rhoades v. State, 848 N.W.2d 22, 26 (Iowa 2014). 
169 See Hernandez, supra note 146, at 47.  
170 While advocates generally believe that people living with HIV should not be prosecuted for their HIV 
status, many argue that this is better achieved by the passage of narrowly tailored, less punitive statutes, 
such as the new Iowa law or the current California law, rather than by a simple repeal of existing laws. This 
is because, in the absence of a specific law, people living with HIV can be—and are—prosecuted 
aggressively through the HIV-specific application of general criminal statutes such as assault with a deadly 
weapon or even attempted murder, as currently happens in Texas and other states. 
171 See, e.g., J. Stan Lehman et al., Prevalence and Public Health Implications of State Laws that 
Criminalize Potential HIV Exposure in the United States, 18 AIDS & BEHAV. 997 (2014) (authored by 
CDC and DOJ representatives); see also BEST PRACTICES GUIDE, supra note 26, at 1–5. 
172 For example, the laws in Indiana, Minnesota, Nevada, Oklahoma, and Tennessee incorporate a risk 
requirement. See sources cited supra note 47. 
173 Several states, most notably Texas, prosecute people living with HIV in this manner. See infra note 184. 
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terms of enumerated acts rather than risk level, the precedent is less directly applicable 
but may still be helpful in sentencing proceedings or in efforts to reform legislation or to 
guide prosecutorial discretion. Finally, Rhoades may also be helpful in the small number 
of states where there is statutory language related to risk mitigation. 
1. States Where Risk is an Element 
 
A small number of states have HIV-specific criminal laws whose plain language 
explicitly requires that the act pose an objective risk of transmission.174 A few other states 
have statutes that contain unclear or ambiguous wording, which could be interpreted to 
require objective risk.175 Finally, a large number of states have prosecuted people living 
with HIV under general criminal statutes such as reckless endangerment, assault with a 
deadly weapon, and even attempted murder; these prosecutions are necessarily predicated 
on the finding (or the unquestioned assumption) that the conduct in question could 
transmit HIV.176 
Rhoades can have the greatest impact as persuasive precedent in those states, 
where risk is an explicit consideration. As long as risk is part of the court’s consideration, 
advocates have the opportunity to dispute the risk level of the conduct in the case. If that 
conduct was oral sex or protected anal sex, the holding of Rhoades is directly applicable. 
Protected vaginal sex is lower-risk than protected anal sex,177 and is a clear enough 
logical analogy. Non-sexual acts that are sometimes prosecuted in these states, such as 
spitting and biting, are essentially no-risk and therefore relatively simple to consider and 
rule out under Rhoades as well.178 Finally, the Rhoades court also cautioned against any 
prosecution of individuals with undetectable viral loads, regardless of their specific 
acts.179 
Nonetheless, though Rhoades may be on point factually and legally for a range of 
cases in numerous states, courts in those states are entirely within their discretion not to 
follow Iowa’s lead. Therefore, a more thorough explanation of the history of the case law 
in Iowa may help to make Rhoades more persuasive to other courts, particularly 
conservative courts. Specifically, it should be noted that Iowa previously adhered to an 
                                                 
174 See sources cited supra note 47. 
175 See, e.g., LA. STAT. ANN. § 14:43.5 (2007); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:34-5(b) (West, Westlaw through Pub. 
L. 2015, ch. 111); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 9A.36.011 (West). 
176 See, e.g., Brock v. State, 555 So.2d 285, 286–87 (Ala. Crim. App. 1989) (attempted murder and lesser 
included assault with a deadly weapon); People v. Dembry, 91 P.3d 431, 433 (Colo. App. 2003) (attempted 
manslaughter and lesser included reckless endangerment); State v. Haines, 545 N.E.2d 834, 835 (Ind. Ct. 
App. 1989) (attempted murder); Hancock v. Commonwealth, 998 S.W.2d 496, 497 (Ky. Ct. App. 1998) 
(wanton endangerment); State v. C.J., No. 01-S-726, 2002 WL 31059244, at *1 (N.H. Super. Ct. May 23, 
2002) (assault with a deadly weapon and reckless conduct); State v. Murphy, No. COA04-681, 2005 WL 
892103, at *1 (N.C. Ct. App. Apr. 19, 2005) (assault with a deadly weapon); Commonwealth v. Cordoba, 
2006 PA Super 165, ¶ 3, 902 A.2d 1280, 1283 (reckless endangerment); Mathonican v. State, 194 S.W.3d 
59, 61 (Tex. App. 2006) (sexual assault with a deadly weapon). 
177 Loutfy et al., supra note 29, at 137.  
178 See id. at 137–38. 
179 See Rhoades v. State, 848 N.W.2d 22, 33 (Iowa 2014) (“Rhoades’s viral count was nondetectable, and 
there is a question of whether it was medically true a person with a nondetectable viral load could transmit 
HIV through contact with the person’s blood, semen or vaginal fluid or whether transmission was merely 
theoretical.”). 
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any-risk standard and allowed multiple convictions under that standard, which were 
affirmed by a relatively liberal bench. Years of seeing that standard in action, however, 
convinced the court to reconsider the evidence and reverse course, even after the court 
had become more conservative180. This history shows that the Rhoades decision was the 
product of considerable experience and deliberation, and these developments counter the 
alternative narrative that the decision was the “judicial activism” of a liberal bench. 
2. States Where Risk is Not an Element 
 
Rhoades is considerably less on point as persuasive precedent in the large number 
of states where risk is not an explicit element of the statute, but rather specific sex acts 
are enumerated (presumably on the implicit, incorrect assumption that they invariably 
carry a significant risk).181 While these statutes vary, most include oral sex and do not 
differentiate based on whether the individual wears a condom.182 Furthermore, none 
explicitly mention viral load.183 
                                                 
180  In 2010, three justices of the Iowa Supreme Court lost their retention elections in reaction to their 
liberal decision in Varnum v. Brien, which legalized same-sex marriage in the state one year prior. A. G. 
Sulzberger, Ouster of Iowa Judges Sends Signal to Bench, N.Y. Times, available 
at http://www.nytimes.com/2010/11/04/us/politics/04judges.html?_r=0 (Nov. 30, 2010). Their 
replacements—Edward Mansfield, Bruce B. Zager, and Thomas Waterman—all received an ideological 
ranking of 1.03 from a Stanford University study, which was more conservative than the Iowa Supreme 
Court's overall ranking of 0.21 (or moderately conservative). See Iowa Supreme Court, 
BallotPedia, https://ballotpedia.org/Iowa_Supreme_Court; Edward Mansfield, 
BallotPedia, https://ballotpedia.org/Edward_Mansfield; Bruce B. Zager, 
BallotPedia, https://ballotpedia.org/Bruce_B._Zager; Thomas Waterman, 
BallotPedia, https://ballotpedia.org/Thomas_Waterman. 
181 See, e.g., ARK. CODE ANN. § 5-14-123(c)(1) (LEXIS through 2015 Reg. Sess. ); CAL. HEALTH & 
SAFETY CODE § 120291(a)–(b) (Deering, LEXIS through 2015 Sess.); GA. CODE ANN. § 16-5-60(c) 
(LEXIS through 2015 Reg. Sess.); IDAHO CODE § 39-608 (2015); 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/12-5.01(b) 
(LexisNexis, LEXIS through P.A. 99-500 of 2016 Reg. Legis. Sess.); IND. CODE. § 35-45-16-2(a)-(f) 
(2015) the Indiana statute criminalizes any exposure of bodily fluids of a person living with HIV, including 
bodily fluids that cannot transmit HIV, and regardless of whether or not the exposure is of a type that can 
transmit HIV); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 21-5424 (West 2012); MICH. COMP. LAWS § 333.5210(2) (2015); MINN. 
STAT. § 609.2241(1)(e) (2015) (citing sex acts listed in section 609.341(12)); MO. REV. STAT. § 191.677 
(2015); N.D. CENT. CODE § 12.1-20-17(1)(b) (2015); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2903.11(E)(4) (West 2006) 
(incorporating sex acts listed in section 2907.01); S.C. CODE ANN. § 44-29-145 (2015); VA. CODE ANN. 
§ 18.2-67.4:1 (West 2012). 
182 Of the statutes cited supra note 190, only the California, Illinois, and Kansas statutes are explicitly 
limited to anal and vaginal sex, and only the California, Illinois, Minnesota, and North Dakota statutes 
explicitly differentiate based on whether a condom is worn (the North Dakota statute nonetheless requires 
disclosure even if a condom is worn; condomless sex is never legal for a North Dakotan living with HIV, 
even with disclosure). 
183 The Idaho statute provides a defense for individuals who have been told by a licensed physician that 
they are “noninfectious.” See IDAHO CODE § 39-608(3)(b) (2015). This provision is puzzling since it was 
enacted in 1988, two decades before there was any understanding of the significance of viral load or the 
possibility that a low viral load could render a person with HIV noninfectious. Barré-Sinoussi, supra note 
1, at 880. None of the other statutes cited supra note 190 reference viral load or a similar concept, though 
some statutes contain risk mitigation language, for which I argue in the following sub-section that viral load 
is a relevant consideration. See discussion infra Section B.3. 
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Courts in those states are bound by those specific and restrictive laws, absent a 
constitutional challenge to their validity.184 However, this does not mean that Rhoades is 
entirely irrelevant. In particular, the findings and reasoning of Rhoades may be invoked 
in sentencing, parole, and clemency proceedings to urge the greatest leniency available 
under the decision-maker’s discretion. The same arguments can be made to prosecutors, 
encouraging them to exercise their discretion not to pursue these cases. Finally, the Iowa 
story—both Rhoades and the contemporaneous legislative reform—may be used to urge 
legislative reform in these states.185 
3. Risk Mitigation and Intent Language 
 
Minnesota is the only other state with an affirmative defense similar to the 
“practical means” defense in the new Iowa statute, exculpating any defendant who “took 
practical means to prevent transmission as advised by a physician or other health 
professional.”186 Like the new Iowa law, the statute applies to diseases other than HIV,187 
which probably explains the more general language rather than a direct reference to 
condoms. 
The Minnesota language begs the question of whether maintaining an 
undetectable viral load is a “practical means to prevent transmission.” Though the theory 
has not yet been tested in the Minnesota courts, the weight of scientific evidence and 
public health discourse increasingly indicates that such a theory should succeed.188 As 
such, it is possible that an undetectable viral load could either negate the risk prong of a 
statute that explicitly references risk—because it lowers the risk below a legally 
cognizable level—or satisfy the risk mitigation prong where there is one—because it is a 
practical method that can be used by the defendant to prevent transmission—or both. 
On its face, this argument helps only in the courts of Iowa and its northern 
neighbor, but it may also reverberate in other states. Specifically, it is possible that 
maintaining an undetectable viral load could also defeat the “intent” prong of some 
statutes, depending on how a court interprets the concept of intent (e.g., intent to have 
sex, intent to create a risk of HIV transmission, or intent to transmit HIV). Wherever 
possible, courts should be urged to abandon a reading of intent as only intent to have sex. 
Under either of the more demanding readings of intent, it is difficult to find intent to 
transmit HIV—or to create a risk of transmission—when a defendant’s conduct poses an 
extremely low risk, and intent to transmit is clearly negated when a defendant takes 
practical means to prevent transmission. 
                                                 
184 Insofar as these laws reach demonstrably no-risk conduct, they may be unconstitutional status 
punishments under the Eighth Amendment pursuant to Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660 (1962), or 
under Equal Protection or Due Process theories. The viability of such challenges is beyond the scope of this 
Note.  
185 See generally Gowans, supra note 146. 
186 See MINN. STAT. § 609.2241(3)(1) (2015). 
187 See id. § 609.2241(1)(a). 
188 See generally Loutfy et al., supra note 29, at 137; Rodger, supra note 40. 
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Additionally, some states provide affirmative defenses for condom use—or 
require that sex be condomless as an element of the offense189—presumably because at 
the time those states passed their HIV laws, condom use was the only known reliable 
method of risk mitigation. Courts cannot rewrite unambiguous statutes to keep pace with 
scientific developments, but they can consider those developments in sentencing, parole, 
or clemency proceedings. Defense counsel in these proceedings can point to the fact that 
an affirmative defense exists for condom use as evidence of legislative intent to excuse 
defendants who take reasonable steps to mitigate or eliminate risk, and then argue that 
maintaining an undetectable viral load is such a step. Thus, through lenient sentencing or 
early parole, courts can give force to the underlying principle that defendants should not 
be punished when they take practical means to prevent transmission. Better still, the same 
reasoning can be employed to encourage prosecutors not to pursue these cases at all. 
C. What about Higher-Risk Acts? 
This Note has focused on sex acts that carry a nonexistent, negligible, or only 
theoretical risk of transmitting HIV; the laws that criminalize those acts; and how to 
reform those laws. The question that lingers in the background is how any of this analysis 
affects sexual conduct that does pose a reasonable or substantial risk of transmitting 
HIV—namely anal and vaginal sex without a condom, and without an undetectable viral 
load. The direct, literal answer is that Rhoades—a decision centered on risk—has no 
impact on the prosecution of those acts, in Iowa or elsewhere. 
It is the position of most HIV activists, and of the author, that even those higher-
risk acts should not be criminalized, or should only be criminalized if the defendant acts 
with specific intent to transmit HIV.190 Even so-called “high risk” acts pose an 
objectively low risk—1.38% for receptive anal intercourse and small fractions of 1% for 
any other act.191 Moreover, criminalization has no demonstrated deterrent effect,192 adds 
to HIV stigma and fear, does not target the highest-risk actors (i.e., those who do not 
know their HIV status), and contradicts other important public health priorities and 
messages.193 However, those criticisms are explicitly policy-based positions that must be 
advanced in legislators’ and prosecutors’ offices, not in courts. 
Rhoades is nonetheless an important step on the path to ending HIV 
criminalization. The majority of HIV prosecutions that take place nationwide are for the 
sorts of no-risk, negligible-risk, or theoretical-risk activities that can no longer be 
prosecuted in Iowa.194 Ending those prosecutions nationwide would severely curtail the 
volume of HIV prosecutions and may ultimately push legislatures and prosecutors to 
reconsider the merits of HIV criminalization as a whole. 
                                                 
189 See, e.g., CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 120291(a)–(b) (Deering, LEXIS through 2015 Sess.); 720 
ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/12-5.01(a)(1) (LexisNexis, LEXIS through P.A. 99-500 of 2016 Reg. Legis. 
Sess.); MINN. STAT. § 609.2241(1)(e) (2015); N.D. CENT. CODE § 12.1-20-17(3) (2015). 
190 See generally POSITIVE JUSTICE PROJECT, CONSENSUS STATEMENT ON THE CRIMINALIZATION OF HIV IN 
THE UNITED STATES 1 (2012), 
http://www.hivlawandpolicy.org/sites/www.hivlawandpolicy.org/files/PJP%20Consensus%20Statement%2
0w%20Endorsers%2010-14.pdf.  
191 See supra note 31.  
192 Galletly et al., supra note 71, at 2135; 15 Ways HIV Criminalization Laws Harm Us All, supra note 5. 
193 Hall et al., supra note 96. 
194 See generally Prosecutions and Arrests, supra note 88. 
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V.  CONCLUSION 
 Rhoades was a watershed moment for HIV activists. For approximately thirty 
years, people living with HIV have been subject to targeting by the criminal law, to 
discrimination by health care providers, to segregation and abuse within the prison 
system, to workplace discrimination, and more. All too often, across all these areas of life 
and law, courts have upheld harsh and discriminatory practices by both state and private 
actors. Those courts have reasoned that an HIV diagnosis is such a grave consequence 
that the slightest risk justifies the most punitive measures—reasoning that no longer 
makes sense given the long and healthy life that a person can now live with HIV and the 
considerably more nuanced knowledge we now have of transmission risks. Courts have 
been slow to change course in the light of new treatment and prevention realities, 
especially in the area of criminal law. Rhoades represents the first high court to recognize 
that modern science should constrain HIV criminalization and the end of a painful six-
year personal journey for Nick Rhoades. 
 Iowa dramatically reformed its law in 2014, establishing similar standards 
legislatively as the court established in Rhoades. While this means that the formal 
importance of Rhoades as controlling precedent is diminished, the case was also an 
important driver of that legislative change. More importantly, both the court’s decision 
and the concurrent legislative change now stand as a blueprint for courts, activists, 
defense counsel, and legislatures from coast to coast as they confront their own states’ 
outdated HIV criminalization regimes. It is now up to those stakeholders to learn from 
the Iowa experience and use it to end the criminalization of people living with HIV 
nationwide. 
